US v. Stanford (1/22/03) is a fascinating case and great decision finding that the government had not produced sufficient evidence of probable causes to justify forfeiture of $242,000 in cash seized from Ms. Stanford at the airport. Long story short, there was insufficient evidence that it was drug money. A must-read opinion for anybody with a forfeiture case, and interesting reading for everybody else too. Poses the nice question: if the government claims that part of the justification for the seizure was that a drug-sniffing doggie alerted on the money, why did the government put the money back into circulation the next day, where some other innocent person could easily be alerted-upon for carrying the same bills???

US v. Saunders (1/23/03) gives a long explanation of what must be shown in order to justify application of the sentencing guideline that increases your guidelines score if you are "in the business of receiving and selling stolen property." Affirms the sentence, rejecting defendant's appeal.

McAbee v. Fort Payne (1/23/03), a rather important environmental decision, holding (in a nutshell) that Alabama's environmental statutes are not "comparable to" the Clean Water Act and therefore that an Alabama citizen can bring suit under the Clean Water Act even if the state environmental agency is pursuing the same matter under the state's own laws. The Court holds that "for state law to be 'comparable,' each class of state-law provisions must be roughly comparable to the corresponding class of federal provisions." and concludes that Alabama's law does not meet this comparability test because Alabama's laws provide for much more limited public participation in agency enforcement activities.

FTC v. Tashman (1/24/03) reverses the District Court, and renders judgment in favor of the FTC, holding that the defendant made misleading statements about the rewards that investors in his phone-card-selling business could earn. According to the Court, the defendant just made up facts to induce people to buy his phone-card-dispensing machines; and the Court holds that this violated the FTCA.

Penalty Kick v. Coca Cola (1/24/03) is about trade secrets and such things. Plaintiff claims that it came up with a great gimmick to place secret messages on Coke bottles that could be decoded only by drinking the coke (and then looking through the bottle). Coke says "other people came up with the idea independently, and we didn't steal anything from you or disclose your secrets." Coke wins, based on the evidence and long discussion of the elements of a trade secrets claim under Georgia law.

US v. Hernandez-Gonzalez (1/27/03), affirming a sentence, holds that the District Court did not commit "plain error" in imposing a 16-level increase for a "crime of violence," because the applicable guideline was ambiguous and hadn’t yet been authoritatively construed and therefore this couldn’t be plain error.

Hawkins v. AL (1/27/03), denying a writ of habeas corpus, discusses what you have to prove in order to show that a state court decision was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of," clearly established federal law under the AEDPA. The case exemplifies the very strict standard that currently applies to federal habeas law.

US v. Lejarde-Rada (1/28/03) rejects defendant's argument that his guilty plea was invalid. His argument is that the District Court failed to make sure he understood the consequences of the plea, in that the District Court failed to tell him that he would not be able to appeal the District Court's refusal to make a downward departure in sentencing. The Circuit says that the District Court was not required to spell that out for him.

US v. Aetna Life (1/28/03) is about the limits of liability, in a qui tam case, of an entity that is a "fiscal intermediary" in the processing of Medicare claims. Aetna's job was apparently to audit the Medicare claims submitted by a provider. The Court holds that Aetna might be liable if it sought federal payment for auditing services that it did not, in fact, perform – but that Aetna is immune from any claim that the underlying provider's claims were fraudulent.

Ford v. Brown (1/30/03). Wow, what a messy dispute. Plaintiff, a Hong Kong lawyer, says that Exxon and others had a conspiracy to cover up their complicity in a major industrial explosion in Hong Kong, and that they defamed him and otherwise messed him up when he refused to go along. Defendants say plaintiff is wacky. The Eleventh Circuit, reversing the District Court, dismisses the case on forum non conveniens grounds, saying 'litigate this in Hong Kong – leave us alone.'

Eleventh Circuit updates

Bellsouth v. MCI (1/10/03, en banc) is about telecom law, the extent of a state public service commission's jurisdiction, and the extent of federal court jurisdiction to review such a commission's order. The holding seems to be that a state commission does have the power to interpret an interconnection agreement, and that federal courts do have jurisdiction to review such interpretations.

Gonzales v. Dept of Corrections (1/13/03) is about various facets of the question whether a Rule 60(b) motion in a habeas corpus proceeding is to be considered a successive petition.

Dorelian v. Atty Gen. (1/13/03) is a denial of rehearing en banc, with concurring and dissenting opinions, regarding temporary stays of removal orders in immigration proceedings.

Shaps v. Provident Life (1/13/03), following an answer by the Fla. S.Ct. to a certified question, is about who bears the burden of proof in a case about disability insurance. More precisely, it's about a choice of law question in that regard; the answer is that the issue is deemed to be "procedural" under Florida law, and therefore Florida's choice of law rules require application of Florida law on this point, so the burden was on the insurer.

Next Century v. Ellis (1/14/03) affirms the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a complaint alleging fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The allegation, essentially, was that the defendant had induced shareholders not to sell their stock, by telling them that he expected "strong performance" by the stock in the future. The only claims at issue here are Georgia state law claims; and the Eleventh Circuit, affirming the dismissal, holds that this just constituted "puffing" that's not actionable under Georgia law, and also that the plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on the statement.

US v. Ortiz (1/14/03) affirms convictions for firearms violations, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant made false statements to a firearms dealer (in that he was buying the firearms planning to sell them to someone else, but filled out a federal form saying otherwise). Also rejects an Apprendi challenge to a guidelines-based sentence increase, holding (a) that Apprendi doesn't apply to guidelines calculations, and (b) that the finding in question didn't increase the sentence beyond the statutory max and therefore doesn't implicate Apprendi.

US v. Steiger (1/14/03) involves a defendant convicted of child pornography, who was tracked and caught by a private citizen who makes a hobby of finding such people on the internet, hacking into their computers, and turning them in. The Court holds that the use of evidence obtained in this manner – and the reliance on this person in the search warrant affidavit – did not violate the Fourth Amendment (because the hacker was not a government agent) and did not require suppression under the federal wiretapping statute. Very interesting opinion.

Ares v. Manuel Diaz Farms (1/17/03) holds that the plaintiff was an agricultural employee and therefore not covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act. He worked for a landscaping company; but the Court held that this company (which was not itself agricultural), and a sister company that was actually in the agriculture business, constituted in effect a single agricultural business entity that was exempt from the FLSA. Odd – it's always difficult to pierce corporate veils and overcome the formalities of separate corporate forms, when plaintiffs want to do that.

Liberty Mutual v. C-Staff (1/17/03), receiving the answer to a question certified to the Ga. S.Ct., holds that in Georgia, if you're holding a judgment and want to institute proceedings to enforce that judgment against other entities (on the theory that they are, e.g., alter egos or fraudulent transferees or successors of the judgment debtor), you have to file a whole new lawsuit against those entities rather than just instituting post-judgment proceedings against them in the original case.

Steger v. GE (1/17/03) affirms a judgment on a jury verdict for the defense in an employment discrimination case. The Court rejects various arguments raised by the plaintiff, holding (inter alia) that the defendant introduced sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that it would have made the same decision even without considering plaintiff's age (and that the reasons given were sufficiently objective to warrant application of this defense); that GE properly raised an affirmative defense in the pretrial order and therefore was properly allowed to rely on it, even though the affirmative defense hadn't been raised in the Answer; that sexist comments by someone other than the decisionmaker were properly excluded; etc.