Eleventh Circuit

US v. Martin (2/6/03) is about a sentencing issue in a money laundering case. Under the 1998 version of the applicable Guideline, the sentence depended on the "value of the funds". The Court holds that if you take $300,000 and launder it through a series of transactions, the "value of the funds" for sentencing purposes is the total of all the transactions (here, over $1 million) rather than just the $300k you started out with. Thus a higher sentence. The Court notes that this might no longer be true, under the 2001 amended version of the applicable Guideline.

McCarthy v. US (2/6/03) applies, and declines to find an exception to, the Supreme Court's opinion in Daniels v. US (2001), to the effect that a person whose sentence is enhanced based on prior convictions cannot file a habeas corpus petition challenging that sentence in order to attack the validity of the prior convictions.

National Labor Relations Board

Decisions are starting to trickle out of the Bush Board. Today's weekly recap from the Board brings a few simple summary judgment cases (i.e., cases in which the employer didn't answer the General Counsel's unfair labor practice Complaint), and one case, Aviation Safeguards (pdf file), finding that an employer that provides baggage handling services at JFK Airport is subject to the RLA, rather than to the NLRA.

Three Eleventh Circuit decisions yesterday:

Tampa Bay Shipbuilding v. Cedar Shipping (2/5/03), a case about repairs to a ship, ends up being an important case about the types of non-expert opinion testimony that are admissible under Rules of Evidence 701(c). To put it most simply, the Court holds that testimony by a business person, stating opinions about business (e.g., lost profits, rates, etc.) based on experience in business, does not have to jump through all the hoops of expert testimony; it can be admitted as layperson opinion testimony under Rule 701(c), just as it could before the adoption of that portion of Rule 701.

Four Seasons v. Consorcio Barr, SA (2/5/03), a case about alleged unauthorized access to a computer network, ends up being a case about the procedural requirements for a preliminary injunction. The Court vacates the preliminary injunction because the Defendant was not given reasonable notice and time to prepare a defense to the motion; there were hotly disputed factual issues, but the Defendant wasn't allowed a fair opportunity to develop and present its case,

Wright v. AmSouth (2/5/03), a case about age discrimination, reverses summary judgment in part. Holds that (a) the EEOC charge was timely, having been filed within 180 days of the unequivocal notice that he was going to be fired (and the District Court erred in asking instead when he should have figured out that he was toast); (b) summary judgment was appropriate on a state law fraud claim, because no proof of present intent not to perform; and (c) no error in refusing to compel an answer to an overbroad discovery request, where pltf didn't offer any way of narrowing it down or identifying what relevant information he was after.

Eleventh Circuit

Patel v. Thompson (1/31/03) upholds an HHS decision that bars Dr. Patel from participation in any federally-funded health programs for 10 years, based on sexual misconduct with a patient. The main issue discussed is whether the regulation calling for this 10-year prohibition (rather tha a shorter one) was improperly applied "retroactively", where the conduct took place before the regulation was adopted. The Court hold that there is no retroactivity problem, because the regulation was remedial rather than punitive and was intended to protect current and future patients.

US v. Ridgeway (1/31/03) vacates a portion of a criminal sentence -- specifically, the portion providing, as a condition of the term of supervised relief, that the defendant refrain from "conduct or activities that would give reasonable cause to believe" that he had violated any criminal law (a condition that is apparently routinely imposed in S.D. Ala.). The Eleventh Circuit says that this is just entirely too vague and therefore can't be imposed.

Hardwick v. Crosby (1/31/03), a capital habeas corpus case, denies relief as to the conviction but holds out some possibility of relief as to the sentence. Defendant had an utterly horrible relationship with appointed counsel, who did practically nothing at trial. Denying relief as to the conviction, the Court indicates that the lawyer's failure to put on witnesses was within the range of reasonable strategy, and that Hardwick has not shown what witnesses might have made a difference had they been called. However, the denial of relief as to the sentence is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing as to whether trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in the sentencing phase, based on failure to put on any mitigating evidence.